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Abstract 
Securities and Exchange Commission in Bangladesh set some rules about the Corporate Governance in 2006 and 
advises the listed company to follow those rules to ensure proper Corporate Governance. The main purpose of 
this study is to know about the disclosure of checklist of Corporate Governance in the banking sector of 
Bangladesh. Certain analysis was done to conduct this study like- dichotomous and partial compliance to find 
out the Overall disclosure Index. Chi-square test and cross tabulation are used to find relation between certain 
variables. Besides, Correlation and regression was performed to analysis those factors that influences the 
disclosure of Corporate Governance. Annual report of 2011 for 30 banks enlisted under Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) has been used to conduct this study. Certain results like higher proportion of independent directors’ gives 
higher disclosure of corporate governance and more insider ownership results less corporate governance have 
been found. Recent scam in banking sector is also the result lack of corporate governance in Bangladesh. This 
research can be used to minimize that scam in the corporate culture. This study creates values not only to those 
banks but also to the other stakeholders who are related to this. Investors and creditors decision can be 
influenced by this study. 
Keywords:Corporate Governance, Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Disclosure, Banks etc. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
“The provision of financial and non-financial information, on a regular basis, to those is interested in the 
economic activities of an organization. The information is normally given in an annual reports and accounts, 
which includes financial statements and other financial and non-financial information. The annual report and 
accounts of a limited company is regulated by company legislation, accounting standards, and in the case of 
quoted company, by stock exchange regulations” (Hussey, 1999 cited in Hasan and Hossain, 2012, 
p.15).‘Corporate governance is generally perceived as a set of codes and guidelines to be followed by companies’ 
(Fernando 2006, p. 16). John and Senbet (1998) refer Corporate Governance as mechanism devices and 
structures which again act as a check on managerial self-centered behavior. Moreover, ‘Corporate Governance 
creates a structure to control the internal management that reduces agency problem’ as well (Hossain et al., 
2009). In its broad definition, corporate governance refers to a set of rules/institutions/practices that minimizes 
the agency cost and the divergence between social and private returns on corporate activity (Monk and Minow, 
1996 and Ararat and Ugar, 2003). In Bangladesh, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) gave some 
guidelines regarding the Corporate Governance in 2006 for proper governance to the listed companies. Fernando 
(2006, p.16) argues ‘[b]ut governance is more than just board processes and procedures’. It involves 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, shareholder and other stakeholders’. However, the 
argument is that the opportunistic behaviors of managers, information asymmetry and their intention to keep 
information with them that benefit themselves are reduced under monitoring environment, then it will lead to 
improve Corporate governance disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001).  
In broad sense, corporate governance deals with the disclosure of four major components in details. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) set those rules which consist of many other components. Four major 
components are-Board of Director; Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Company Sectary (CS), Head of Internal 
Audit (HIA); Audit Committee and External Auditor cannot engage in some specific job. On the other hand, 
most banks in Bangladesh are privatized. There are 47 scheduled banks in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank, 2013). 
Out of those 47 banks 30 banks are enlisted to Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). This study will cover the banks 
enlisted under DSE and how they follow the guidelines set by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Moreover, this study will show the disclosure level of each bank with some disclosure method and give some 
mathematical result. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Reaz and Arun (2006) show the problems of Corporate Governance in the Banking sector and the impact of 
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political interference and failure by regulators on it. I addition, the weakness of the structure of Corporate 
Governance on Banking sector in Bangladesh has been focused with the involvement of structure of ownership, 
executive aspects, disclosure and audit practice etc. To conduct this study, they mainly focus on the importance 
of Corporate Governance and its contribution to economic growth through financial development. Bhuiyan and 
Biswas (2007) have conducted research on a sample of hundred and fifty five companies listed under Dhaka 
Stock Exchange where forty five disclosure items were chosen, so that disclosure level of those companies can 
be measured. This study mainly depicts sector-wise difference among the Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Index (CGDI) of those sectors where the mean and standard deviation were 56.04 and 17.20 respectively. 
Besides, multiple regression provides that CGDI is significantly influenced by some attribute like local 
ownership, the SEC notification and the size of the company; while, there are some other attribute like age, 
multinational companies, and the size of the board of directors which did not influence significantly to CGDI. 
Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) had set 5% significant level to conduct this research.Uddin and Choudhury (2008) 
showed a link between traditional and rational culture of Corporate Governance in Bangladesh. This study is 
comprised of semi-structured interviews, observation, documentation etc. which depict the influence of family 
member to the Corporate Governance. As result, they also focused how the board of directors influences through 
their families. Siddiqui (2010) highlights mainly the model of Corporate Governance where main focus was on- 
What model to measure corporate Governance in Bangladesh is adopted and what has influenced to adopt that 
model. Besides, what model may be suitable is also discussed in this study. This study results that Bangladesh 
has adopted the Anglo-American shareholder model that may create legitimacy threats rather than efficiency. 
Chaudhudy, Das, and Mishra (2011) examined the disclosure of different factors of corporate governance for 
certain specific company composing twelve financial institutions, six commercial banks and six developments 
banks. For this reason, six parameters were chosen to compare the factors of corporate governance. But the study 
did not show any relation among those parameters and chosen banks. Hasan and Hossain (2012) showed the 
overall disclosure level is 67% which is not a good score because this score does not provide a good signal to the 
stakeholder. Besides, this percentage is not enough to show good governance and transparency. Though the 
procedure was good enough to provide a good result but problem can be on the data collection process. To 
conduct this study, the disclosure, distribution of disclosure, disclosure checklist, scoring the disclosure, 
developing of disclosure index, dichotomous procedure, and Partial Compliance approach were used. Hasan, 
Hossain, and Swieringa (2013) assessed the corporate governance and financial disclosure on Bangladeshi 
perspectives. This study was done through the analysis of annual report of twenty Bangladeshi companies with 
four different industries, each containing five companies. This amount of sample cannot be the representative 
against total population. 
 
3.1 Bangladesh: Socio-economic and Political Condition 
Bangladesh is one of the slowest growing economies in the world. Like most underdeveloped economies, the 
population pressure is only a part of the story. The main problems are political stability, a relatively high (low) 
proportion of output and labour force in agriculture (industry), inadequate technology and capital, low saving 
rates volatile export earnings from a high proportion of traditional exports, low literacy rate and an unskilled 
labor force. In terms of GNP Bangladesh falls in the Low Income Category of countries according to the World 
Bank. During 1991-95 GDP growth averaged 4.1% in Bangladesh (World Development Indicators, 1997). Over 
the last couple of decades, Bangladesh has been pursuing various development strategies to improve the living 
standards of its people. The per capita income of Bangladesh was $240 in 1995 (World Development Indicators, 
1997). Bangladesh has one of the highest densities of population, at around 800 persons per square kilometer in 
1995. Bangladesh has a population of about 120 million with an annual growth of 1.6% which slowed down the 
growth of domestic national product. The economy is largely agricultural, with 31% of GDP coming from 
agriculture and involving 64% of the labor force in 1990 (World Development Indicators, 1997). Since 
independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been trying to achieve self-sufficiency in food grain production and she 
has nearly achieved success in this goal. Agriculture remains the mainstay of the economy of Bangladesh and 
this sector contributed 38% to GDP in 1993 (World Development Reports, 1994). Lack of capital, reliance on 
garments export and rapid population growth has been hampering economic development over years. In addition, 
Pakistani rule (1947-1971), military rule and economic discrimination are generally considered to have hindered 
the development process.The development plans of Bangladesh are mainly financed by external aid agencies, 
such as World Bank, to the extent during the Third Five Year Plan Period (1985-90) she borrowed up to 88% of 
her development budget from these sources. The Government has been trying to open up the economy by 
emphasizing private enterprise, encouraging foreign investment and setting up Export Processing Zones. Since 
1989, the garments industry has been growing rapidly due to the government’s economic liberalization policies, 
low wages and fiscal incentives. 
3.2 Stock Market in Bangladesh 
After independence, major companies were nationalized and there was no stock exchange in Bangladesh till 
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1976. Before independence, a stock exchange had been established in Dhaka, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
in 1954 as a corporate body under the Companies Act 1913. However, it operated on a very small scale in the 
first 25 years of existence. The DSE did not develop under the Pakistani regime during 1947-71. After the 
emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, the DSE market ceased to exist due to the government policy of nationalizing 
all the major industries of the country. In 1976, the DSE was reactivated with nine listed companies due to the 
change in the attitude of the then government towards the development of the public sector and promotion of a 
market economy.One of the features of the capital market in Bangladesh is the concentration of share ownership- 
a few shareholders’ account for substantial part of total shareholders’ value. At present, the capital market in 
Bangladesh consists mainly of the DSE, three government development financial institutions (DFIs), namely the 
Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Shangstha (BSRS), the Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB) and the Investment Corporation 
of Bangladesh (ICB) and a few newly created private Investment Banks (Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995). The 
Companies Act, 1994 and the Securities and Exchange rules, 1987 are the most important laws which regulate 
the financial reports. As already noted the financial reporting practice of listed companies in Bangladesh made is 
mainly based on the legal requirements of the Companies Act, 1994 and the Securities and Exchange Rules, 
1987. The Security and Exchange Rules, 1987 contain the detailed provisions regarding the contents of balance 
sheet, profit and loss account, and auditors’ report. Proper issuance of securities, protections of the interest of the 
investors and promotion of development, regulation of the capital and securities market are the basic strategies of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. These rules have increased the disclosure requirements of the listed 
companies in Bangladesh. 
In the case of developed countries, requirements of the stock exchange can significantly affect disclosure aspect 
of financial reporting. In Bangladesh, the listing of does not prescribe any additional disclosure requirements 
governing in financial reports as a part of listing requirements per se other than the legal disclosure requirements 
i.e., the Companies Act, 1994, the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 and adopted international accounting 
standards.  
3.3 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The Securities and Exchange Authority in Pakistan prepared the Securities and Exchange rules, 1971 which 
came into force on March 19, 1971. The Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 was passed and enforced in 
the then Pakistan and at the same time the Securities and Exchange Authority (SEA) was established. The 
accounting rules were included in the legislation applicable to those companies who were trading on the stock 
exchanges in Pakistan (including Dhaka Stock Exchange). After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, this 
Ordinance was accepted as existing law in Bangladesh, but no Securities and Exchange Authority (SEA) was 
established. In 1987, the Government of Bangladesh took some important steps to enforce the aforesaid 
Ordinance and rules. As a result the Investment Wing of the Finance Division of the Ministry of Finance passed 
and enforced the securities and exchange Rules (SER), 1987. The SER became effective in September, 1987 
following the Securities and Exchange Authority to regulate the disclosure and Accounting practices of listed 
companies in Bangladesh.(Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995). The SER, 1987 is applicable to companies that are 
trading on the stock exchanges in Bangladesh. In 1993, the Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993 was 
passed and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established with the work to protect investors, 
to promote and develop capital market and to regulate securities market in Bangladesh. Any company intends to 
raise capital from public must require prior approval of the SEC. The SEC of Bangladesh was granted regular 
membership of the International Organization of Securities Commission in 1995. The objectives the SEC of 
Bangladesh are (a) protection of the interest of the investors’ securities; (b) regulation and development of 
securities market; and (c) ensuring proper issuance of securities and compliance of law relating to securities. The 
SEC is the most important regulatory authority who provides the guarantee that the investors will not be the prey 
to any fraudulent and unfair trade practices to securities they traded. 
The accounting and auditing standards as adopted by the ICAB have legal backing as the SEC of Bangladesh 
made these standards as mandatory. As a result, the quality of financial disclosure by the listed companies will be 
improved. At the same time, the auditing of the listed companies is expected to be improved if the concerned 
accountancy firms follow these auditing standards properly. Several accounting and auditing standards are 
expected to be adopted in near future. In the cases of Bangladesh the maximum time limit to prepare corporate 
annual reports or financial statements for presentation at the annual general meeting is nine months from the 
accounting year end. In 1999, the SEC decided to conduct special audit on several listed companies that failed to 
hold their scheduled annual general meetings in time.  At the same time SEC imposed a penalty of Taka 10,000 
for each day of defaulting. Such steps will ensure timely AGM as well as publication of the annual reports of the 
listed companies in Bangladesh. 
A majority of the listed companies (around 150) did not declare any dividend. There are companies that earned 
adequate profit to declare reasonable dividend (25%-35%). However, some companies declare nominal dividend 
(5% to 15%) dividend. The SEC of Bangladesh imposed some penalties including restriction of trading their 
shares at the stock exchanges in Bangladesh. 
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3.4 Corporate Governance in Bangladesh 
Since the stock market debacle and aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis in Asia, and in view of recent corporate 
scandals in the USA and other developed countries, the concern about corporate governance has increased in 
Bangladesh and elsewhere. The moral hazard problems created an atmosphere in which political skills are more 
important to success than is the business skills. The majority of these failures have been attributed to an absence 
or dereliction of efficient disclosure and corporate governance (Okeahalam, 2004).  
It has been argued that in most developing countries the reform process through corporate governance has been 
difficult and slower than expected due to the complexity and path dependency of the economic, social, legal 
structures and law enforcement in these countries is compromised the fact that the courts are under-financed, 
under resourced and lack the necessary expertise (Ararat and Ugar, 2003). Unfortunately, very little is known 
about the Corporate Governance practices in Bangladesh. One of the most important barriers for conducting a 
study is the difficulty of obtaining relevant information. The easiest source of information is the corporate laws 
and very little information is available with respect to the practice of corporate governance in Bangladesh. 
3.5 Guideline of Corporate Governance by Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh (SECB) 
Under the condition of SEC’s notification No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08 dated 20th February 2006 
issued under section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Commission Ordinance 1969, Securities and Exchange 
Commission gives some guidelines to the companies which are enlisted under SEC and all the company under 
SEC need to follow those guidelines. If they did not follow, then they are advised to mention the reasons. The 
guidelines contain four different part and these are- Board of Directors; Chief Financial Officer(CFO), Head of 
Internal Audit and Company Secretary;  Audit Committee;  Statutory/ External Auditors engaged or not. 
3.5.1 Board of Directors 
In case of board size, the number of board members of the company should be less than 5 (five) and more than 
20 (twenty). Besides every company should encourage independent directors who are effective and the 
independent director should be appointed by the elected directors. Accordindg to Fama and Jensen (1983, cited 
in Hasan, Hossain, and Swieringa, 2013), ‘[t]he board, which comprises of a number of independent directors, 
has a greater monitoring and controlling ability over management’. In this case, the number of independent 
directors should be one out of ten boards of directors. Moreover, the chairman of the board and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) must be different person and what is their respective role and responsibility would be clearly 
defined by the board of directors. In some Asian Countries (e.g., Japan), the board of directors seems to serve 
mainly ceremonial purposes since they do not represent the shareholders’ interest. However, it is not possible to 
find out whether corporate boards are ceremonial in nature or effective decision-making bodies. 
The directors of the companies should disclose some other information to shareholder- 
 Fairness of state of affairs/ Financial Statements 
 Maintenance proper books of accounts 
 Consistent application of accounting policies in preparation of financial 
 Compliance with International Accounting Standard 
 Soundness and efficiency of internal control system 
 Ability of Company to continue as a going concern 
 Significant deviations from last year in operating results 
 Presentation of key operating and financial data for last three years 
 Declare dividend 
 Number of board meetings held during the year and attendance by each director 
 Sharing Pattern 
3.5.2 Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Head of Internal Audit and Company Secretary 
In this part, the company should appoint a CFO, a Head of Internal Audit and Company Secretary. Moreover, the 
Board of Directors should clearly define the respective role and responsibility of those particular appointed 
person. The Cadbury Committee on Corporate Govrnence (Cadbury, 1995 cited in Kha et al, 2009) reconized the 
company secretary’s unique position as a key role in ensuring that board procedures are followed and regularly 
reviewed. Besides, the attendance in board meeting of those particular appointed person is also essential which a 
company should disclose in the annual report. 
3.5.3 Audit Committee 
Audit committee of a company should act as a subcommittee of the Board of Directors. This committee will 
responsible to the Board of Directors and ensure that the financial statements reflect true and fair view of the 
state of affairs of the company and in ensuring a good monitoring system within the business. Moreover, the 
argument to reduce agency conflicts, audit committee act as a monitoring mechenism and their act  has been 
emphasized by many researchers(e.g., Abbot and Parker, 2000; Chen et al. 2005, Kha et al, 2009). The duties of 
the audit committee are- 
 Audit committee should be composed of at least 3 members and out of them 1 should be independent 
directors.  
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 If the member number becomes less than 3, then the Board of Director should appoint new member 
immediately or not later than 1 month from the vacancy. 
 The Board of Directors should select a chairman of the Audit Committee who should a professional 
qualification or knowledge, understanding and experiencing in accounting or finance 
There are some other factor that the Audit Committee should report to the Board of Directors, Authorities and 
the Shareholders and General Investors. This are- 
 All the activities should be reported to the Board of Directors but there are some factors that should 
report immediately to the Board of Directors.  
(a) Report on conflict interests; 
(b) Suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or material defect in the internal control 
system; 
(c) Suspected infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules and regulations; 
and 
(d) Any other matter which should be disclosed to the Board of Directors immediately. 
 If Audit Committee monitors any material impact on the financial condition, then they will discuss with 
the Board of Director. If any rectification is necessary about this matter but neither Board of Director 
nor management takes care regarding this matter, then Audit Committee should report to the 
Commission. In this case, Audit Committee should consider two thing which occur earlier- 
(a) They will inform Board of Director for three times, or 
(b) They have to wait a period of nine months from the date of first reporting to the Board of 
Directors. 
 Those four factors should report immediately to the Board of Directors, should be signed by the 
Chairman of the Audit Committee and disclosed in the annual report of the issuer company 
3.3.4 External/ Statutory Auditors  
The company should not engage its external auditors to perform the following services of the company; namely- 
o Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; 
o Financial information systems design and implementation; 
o Book-keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements; 
o Broker-dealer services; 
o Actuarial Services; 
o Internal audit services; and 
o Any other services that the Audit Committee determines. 
3.3.5 Reporting the Compliance in the Director’s Report 
The directors of the company shall state, in accordance with the annexure attached, in the directors’ report 
whether the company has complied with these conditions. 
 
4.1 Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this study is to find out the relation and influence of certain independent variable that act as 
corporate governance factors to overall disclosure index in the banking sector in Bangladesh. The chosen actors 
for corporate governance are board size, percentage of independent director to total members on board, 
percentage of insider ownership and percentage of audit committee member to total member on the board. There 
are other factors like firm size, total capital and leverage. This study finds out the relation of all this factors with 
overall disclosure index.  
4.2 Scope of the Study 
The Scope of the study was confined to the listed banks under DSE and CSE. As all the banks are incorporated 
and enlisted under DSE and CSE, the standard of corporate governance factors is also similar. These thirty banks 
have been compared on the basis of the corporate governance and its requirement like Board of Directors, Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO), Company Sectary (CS), Head of Internal Audit (HIA); Audit Committee and External 
Auditor cannot engage in some specific job. 
4.3 Objective of the Study 
The objective of corporate governance can be achieved by putting in place standards, transparency requirements 
and monitoring and compliance mechanisms that corporations must adhere to (World Bank Group, 1999, 2002). 
The main objective of the present study is to compare the corporate governance among 30 banks enlisted under 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) in Bangladesh 
 
5.0 Research Methods and Methodology 
This study has been conducted based on quantitative and qualitative approach. There are 47 schedule banks in 
Bangladesh. Out of those, 30 banks are enlisted under Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). Secondary data from the 
annual report has been used to conduct this study. The annual reports of 2011 for each bank were analyzed to 
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conduct this study. This annual reports are mostly available in the banks website and DSE library provides a 
huge range of annual reports. The information of the annual reports is used to find out the disclosure level that 
each bank made to ensure their highest Corporate Governance. Besides, the query from the banks has also played 
a vital role to conduct this study. In this case, the guideline of SEC has been used for the study. There were 36 
points that ensure whether a company maintains corporate governance or not. Both qualitative and quantitative 
information is present in those 36 points. For the quantitative information, annual reports were sufficient to 
conduct this study. But it was not enough for the qualitative information. In that case, banks disclosure points 
were correlated with the findings from the annual reports and consulting with the experts. 
5.1 Sample Selection 
Table-1: Percentage of Sample comparing Total Population 
Particular Population Size Sample Size Sample as Percentage of Population 
Banks 47 30 63.83% 
For a research, 30% sample should be covered; whereas, this study has covered 63.83% sample. On the other 
hand, this study has been focused only on the specific banks enlisted under DSE. A almost similar type of study 
has been done by Hasan and Hossain (2012), where total sample number was tweenty for four different 
industries. Each industry consists of five individual company. 
5.2 Selection of Disclosure Items 
The summary of the checklists that each bank under DSE should disclosed given in the table-2 below: 
Table 2- Selection of Disclosure Items 
Particulars Disclosure 
key 
Total Item 
Number Percentage 
(%) 
Board of Directors BD 15 41.67 
Chief Financial Officer(CFO), Head of Internal Audit and 
Company Secretary 
CHC 2  
5.56 
Audit Committee AC 12 33.33 
Statutory/ External Auditors not to engage in SA 7 19.44 
Overall Disclosure  36 100% 
In the above table, there are four (4) disclosures key which are made short from the particular part. The bold and 
underlined alphabets of each word have been taken to represent as short disclosure key form. 
5.3 Scoring of Disclosure Items 
All the 36 items were considered equally important. When a company discloses an item in annual report, point 
“1” is awarded. But the score will be “0”, when the item does not appear. 
5.4 Formula of Disclosing Index 
There are two types of approach to calculate the disclosure index and this are- 
• Dichotomous Approach 
• PC or Partial Compliance  Approach 
These two indexes can be weighted and unweighted. In case of weighted approach, all value of disclosure carries 
weight which is generally assigned by researcher. On the other hand, all the items under unweighted approach 
are considered as equally important. This study has been done with the unweighted approach where all the 
disclosure value carries equal importance. 
Dichotomous Approach 
ODI= (Ʃdmi/Ʃdni) 
Where, d= 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 if an item is not disclosed 
 m= number of item disclosed 
 n= maximum number of disclosure items possible 
PC Approach 
In case of Partial Compliance Approach, unweighted method was used to measure the overall disclosure 
PCj= (∑xi/Rj) 
Where, 
PCj= Total compliance score for each company and 0≤PCj≤1. 
Xi= Level of compliance with each part of disclosure requirement. 
I= 1 
Rj= Total number of disclosure part of each company. 
 
5.5 Construction of Disclosure Index 
Both the Partial Compliance Unweighted (PC) Approach and Dichotomous Approach has been used to conduct 
the study.  Hasan and Hossain (2012, p.17) stated that PC approach shows more accurate result than 
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Dichotomous Approach. Suppose there are five sections of disclosure X, Y, Z, A and B. Their possible item to 
be disclosed and the ultimate disclosed items are bellow: 
Table 3- Hypothetical data using to show the calculation through PC and Dichotomous method 
Particulars Item can be disclosed Disclosed Item (Case 01) Disclosed Item (Case 02) 
X 3 3 1 
Y 6 3 3 
Z 11 9 11 
Total 20 15 15 
 
The PC and Dichotomous approach for Case 01 will be 
Under PC Approach, 
 ODI= (3/3+3/6+9/11)/3=0.77 or 77% 
Under Dichotomous approach 
ODI=15/20= 0.75 or 75% 
Conversely, if the company discloses like Case 02,  
Under PC Approach, 
 ODI= (1/3+ 3/6+ 11/11)/3= 0.61 or 61% 
Under Dichotomous approach 
ODI=15/20= 0.75 or 75% 
The PC approach provides more accurate result than Dichotomous Approach. 
 
5.6 Annual Report of Sample Companies 
The annual reports of following 30 banks enlisted in DSE were collected from various sources.  
Table 4- Banks name that are used to conduct the research. 
Serial No. Banks Name Company Key 
1. AB Bank Limited ABBL 
2. Al-Arafah Islami Bank Limited AAIBL 
3. Bank Asia Limited BAL 
4. BRAC Bank Limited BBL 
5. The City Bank Limited CBL 
6. Dhaka Bank Limited DBL 
7. Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited DBBL 
8. Eastern Bank Limited EBL 
9. Export Import Bank of Bangladesh Limited EXIMBBL 
10. First Security Islami Bank Limited FSIBL 
11. Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited IBBL 
12. ICB Islamic Bank Limited ICBIBL 
13. IFIC Bank Limited IFICBL 
14. Jamuan Bank Limited JBL 
15. Mercantile Bank Limited MBL 
16. Mutual Trust Bank Limited MTBL 
17. National Bank Limited NBL 
17. National Credit and Commercial Bank Limited NCCBL 
19. ONE Bank Limited ONEBL 
20. Premier Bank Limited PREBL 
21. Prime Bank Limited PRIBL 
22. Pubali Bank Limited PUBL 
23. Rupali Bank Limited RBL 
24. Shahjalal Islami Bank Limited SHIBL 
25. Social Islami Bank Limited SIBL 
26. Southeast Bank Limited SEBL 
27. Standard Bank Limited SBL 
28. Trust Bank Limited TBL 
29. United Commercial Bank Limited UCBL 
30. Uttara Bank Limited UBL 
The short form of each bank is also shown under the headline of the Company Key and this is also made to do 
the further work in an easy way. 
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5.7 Check List 
SEC’s guideline consists of 36 points that a company should disclose to maintain proper Corporate Governance. 
This check list is given as bellow: 
Table 5- Check list that is found out to conduct this research 
Company Name 
Clause Check list  
1 Board of Directors  
1.1 1. Board’s Size  
1.2(і) 2. Independent Directors  
1.2(іі) 3. Appointment of independent Non-shareholder Director  
1.3 4. Chairman and Chief Executive  
1.4 The directors Report to shareholders  
 5. Fairness of state of affairs/ Financial Statements  
 6. Maintenance proper books of accounts  
 7. consistent application of accounting policies in preparation of 
financial 
 
 8. Compliance with International Accounting Standard  
 9. Soundness and efficiency of internal control system  
 10. Ability of Company to continue as a growing concern  
 11. Significant deviations from last year in operating results  
 12. Presentation of key operating and financial data for last three 
years 
 
 13. Declare dividend  
 14. Number of board meetings held during the year and 
attendance by each director 
 
 15. Sharing Pattern  
2. Chief Financial Officer(CFO), Head of Internal Audit and 
Company Secretary 
 
2.1 16. Appointment of CFO, Head of Internal Audit and Company 
Secretary 
 
2.2 17. Attendance of CFO and Company Secretary in Board 
Meeting 
 
3. Audit Committee  
3.1 18. Composition of Audit Committee  
 19. Inclusion of one Independent Directors in the Audit 
Committee 
 
 20. Filling of Causal vacancy in Audit Committee  
 21. Chairman of Audit Committee  
 22. Audit Committee Chairman’s Professional Qualification  
3.3 Reporting of Audit Committee  
3.3.1 23. Reporting to the Board of Directors  
 24. Conflict of Interest  
 25. Suspected materials defect in internal control system  
 26. Suspected infringement of laws  
 27. Any other matter  
3.3.2 28. Reporting to the Authorities  
3.4 29. Reporting to the shareholders  
4. Statutory/ External Auditors not to engage in  
 30. Appraisal or valuation services  
 31. Financial system design and implementation  
 32. Book keeping or other services related to Financial 
Statements 
 
 33. Broker- Dealer services  
 34. Actuarial Services  
 35. Internal Audit Services  
 36. Any other services that the  Audit Committee determines  
 TOTAL DISCLOSURE POINTS  
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5.8 Technique of Statistics 
Different measurement of disclosure like Dicthomous method, Partial Compliance method is used to know the 
overall disclosure index. Besides, three pair of variables was analyzed to find out the influence between each 
other through Chi-Square Tests.  
5.9 Research Hypotheses 
Two sets of hypotheses have been set to conduct this study. First set of hypotheses will be analyzed through Chi-
square test and cross tabulation. On the other hand, second set will be examined by descriptive statistics, 
correlation and regression analysis.  
5.9.1 First Set of Hypothesis 
H1: There is significant influence between Board’s Size and Independent Directors 
H2: There is significant influence between Board’s Size and Number of board meeting held during the 
year and attendance by each director. 
H3: There is significant influence between Independent Directors and Inclusion of one Independent 
Director in the Audit Committee. 
5.9.2 Second Set of Hypotheses 
The main objective of this study is to find out the relation between the disclosure of Corporate Governance and 
banking sector in Bangladesh. Certain variable has been used to find out this relation like- board size, 
Independent Director, Insider Ownership and audit committee. 
Board Size: 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) argue that the probability of reducing information asymmetry can be the result of more 
directors in the board. On the other hand, Zahra, et al. (2000) argues the information procession become faster 
because of small board. However, it is been considered that more number of directors in a board will promote the 
company, so that, it can perform its activities in a greater way. As a result, the chance of disclosure will be high. 
So, the hypotheses that has been set in this study- 
H1: Board Size is positively related to the Overall Disclosure Index. 
Independent Director 
Independent directors act as trustees to create trust between a company and its investors through their active 
involvement with the board that ensures a good Corporate Governance (Bose, 2009). Besides, Independent 
directors are more independent when make judgment when they are in the boardroom and plays a key role to 
protect the interest of shareholders (Liu and Yang, 2008). Besides, the inclusion of a great number of 
independent directors on board can lead to more voluntary disclosure in the firm (Leftwich, Watts and 
Zemmerman, 1981). So the hypotheses that has been set to conduct this study is- 
H2: A higher proportion of Independent Director on the board is positively related to Overall Disclosure Index. 
Insider Ownership 
The governance structure of public limited companies is also responsible for the weak condition in that these 
companies prefer to keep ownership holdings within the family connections i.e., closely-held companies. It is 
revealed that in Bangladesh 72.5% of the outstanding shares are owned by households/ sponsors and individuals. 
Insignificant concentration is observed by bank and financial institutions i.e., 3.1 % and foreigners held 16% and 
Government/financial institutions held only 16% of the outstanding shares in 2000 (Chowdhury, 2006). It is also 
reported that even when the company is listed on the stock exchange, few shares are available for trading, as 
majority remain held by the original sponsors. The original sponsors often buy additional shares from the market 
to raise their holdings to as high as 70 percent or 80 percent though shares are floated in the primary market on 
50:50 basis (Chowdhury, 2006). The argument about insider or outsider ownership that led to firm performance 
through proper corporate governance is a controversial matter. Han and Suk (1998) depict that better 
performance can be led through the increase of director ownership. However, Hossain et al., (1994) illustrate that 
wide spread of ownership causes more information disclosure in the firm. Considering all factors, the hypotheses 
that has been set is that- 
H3: Insider Ownership is negatively related Overall Disclosure Index. 
Audit Committee 
Effective audit committee can influence to disclose corporate governance factors properly which will ultimately 
led to less fraud in the firms. A statement suggested by shareholders more than a decade earlier is that it is 
possible to decrease the fraudulent financial reporting through the improvement of effective audit committee 
(NCFFR, 1987; POB, 1993; Levitt, 1998; Myers and Zeigenfuess, 2006). Furthermore, external auditors get 
assistance from audit committee through their analysis, findings and recommendations (Puri, Trehan and Kakkar, 
2010). So the hypotheses will be- 
H4: A Higher Proportion of audit committee members on the board are positively related to Overall Disclosure 
Index. 
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5.10 Regression Model and Variable Defined 
To conduct this study, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression has been used to analyze the relationship between 
Dependent Variables (ODI) and Independent Variables. The following regression is used to estimate this study- 
ODI= ∞ + β1 BS + β2 PIND + β3 PIO + β4 PAC + β5 TA + β6 TC + β7 LEV +ε 
Here,  
ODI Overall Disclosure Index 
BS Board Size 
PIND Percentage of Independent Directors to Total Members on Board 
PIO Percentage of Insider Ownership to Total Share on Bank 
PAC Percentage of Audit Committee Member to Total Member on Board 
TA Total Asset in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
TC Total Capital  in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
LEV Ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity 
 
Table 6-List of Variables, Levels, Expected Signs and Relationship in the Regression 
Variables Labels in 
the OLS 
Description of variables Expected sign and relationship 
ODI Overall Disclosure Index (Partial 
Compliance) 
Index 
β1 BS BS represents Board size represents total 
number of board members in each bank 
(+) BS has a significant positive 
relationship with ODI. 
β2 PIND PIND represents Percentage of 
Independent Directors to Total Members 
on Board 
(+) PIND has a significant positive 
relationship with ODI. 
β3 PIO PIO represents Percentage of Insider 
Ownership to Total Share on the Banks 
(-) PIO is negatively related to the ODI. 
β4 PAC PAC represents Percentage of Audit 
Committee Member to Total Members on 
Board 
(+) PAC has a significant positive 
relation with the ODI. 
β5 TA TA represents Total Asset in Millions of 
Bangladeshi Taka 
(+) TA is associated positively with ODI. 
β6 TC TC represents Total Capital  in Millions of 
Bangladeshi Taka 
(+)TC is associated positively with ODI. 
β7 LEV LEV represents Ratio of Total Debt to 
Total Equity 
(+) LEV has a significant positive 
relationship with ODI. 
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6.0 Results and Discussions 
6.1 Discussion of ODI (Dichotomous and PC Approach): 
Table 7: Overall Disclosure Index through Dichotomous Procedure 
Serial 
No. 
Company 
Key Disclosure Analysis through Dichotomous Approach 
    BD(15) CHC(2) AC(12) SA(7) 
Total 
Disclosure 
(36) ODI 
1 ABBL 15 1 12 7 35 0.97 
2 AAIBL 15 1 11 7 34 0.94 
3 BAL 14 1 11 7 33 0.92 
4 BBL 14 1 11 7 33 0.92 
5 CBL 13 1 10 7 31 0.86 
6 DBL 13 1 10 7 31 0.86 
7 DBBL 14 2 11 7 34 0.94 
8 EBL 15 2 11 7 35 0.97 
9 EXIMBBL 12 1 11 7 31 0.86 
10 FSIBL 11 1 10 7 28 0.81 
11 IBBL 15 1 11 7 34 0.94 
12 ICBIBL 11 2 11 7 31 0.86 
13 IFICBL 14 1 11 7 33 0.92 
14 JBL 13 1 10 7 31 0.86 
15 MBL 12 1 10 7 30 0.83 
16 MTBL 11 1 10 7 29 0.81 
17 NBL 12 1 10 7 30 0.83 
18 NCCBL 11 1 11 7 30 0.83 
19 ONEBL 14 2 11 7 34 0.94 
20 PREBL 14 1 11 7 33 0.92 
21 PRIBL 14 2 11 7 34 0.94 
22 PUBL 14 1 11 7 33 0.92 
23 RBL 12 2 10 7 31 0.86 
24 SHIBL 13 1 11 7 32 0.89 
25 SIBL 13 1 10 7 31 0.86 
26 SEBL 14 1 12 7 34 0.94 
27 SBL 13 2 11 7 33 0.92 
28 TBL 13 2 11 7 33 0.92 
29 UCBL 12 1 11 7 31 0.86 
30 UBL 14 1 11 7 33 0.92 
ODI 13.17  1.27 10.77 7 32.17 0.89 
Table 7 shows that highest ODI  is 97% in the ABBL and EBL. On the other hand,  lowest ODI is 81% in FSIB 
and MTBL. The  Overall  Disclosure Index in 89%.  
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Table 8- Overall Disclosure Index through PC Approach 
Serial No. Company Key 
 
Disclosure Analysis Through PC or Partial Compliance Approach 
  
    BD(15) PC(BD) CHC(2) PC(CHC) AC(12) PC(AC) SA(7) PC(SA) 
Total Disclosure 
(36) ODI 
1 ABBL 15 1 1 0.5 12 1 7 1 3.5 0.88 
2 AAIBL 15 1 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.42 0.85 
3 BAL 14 0.93 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.35 0.84 
4 BBL 14 0.93 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.35 0.84 
5 CBL 13 0.87 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.2 0.8 
6 DBL 13 0.87 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.2 0.8 
7 DBBL 14 0.93 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.85 0.96 
8 EBL 15 1 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.92 0.98 
9 EXIMBBL 12 0.8 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.22 0.80 
10 FSIBL 11 0.73 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.07 0.77 
11 IBBL 15 1 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.42 0.85 
12 ICBIBL 11 0.73 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.65 0.91 
13 IFICBL 14 0.93 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.35 0.84 
14 JBL 13 0.87 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.2 0.8 
15 MBL 12 0.8 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.13 0.78 
16 MTBL 11 0.73 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.07 0.77 
17 NBL 12 0.8 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.13 0.78 
18 NCCBL 11 0.73 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.15 0.79 
19 ONEBL 14 0.93 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.85 0.96 
20 PREBL 14 0.93 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.35 0.84 
21 PRIBL 14 0.93 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.85 0.96 
22 PUBL 14 0.93 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.35 0.84 
23 RBL 12 0.8 2 1 10 0.83 7 1 3.63 0.91 
24 SHIBL 13 0.87 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.28 0.82 
25 SIBL 13 0.87 1 0.5 10 0.83 7 1 3.2 0.8 
26 SEBL 14 0.93 1 0.5 12 1 7 1 3.43 0.86 
27 SBL 13 0.87 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.78 0.95 
28 TBL 13 0.87 2 1 11 0.92 7 1 3.78 0.95 
29 UCBL 12 0.8 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.22 0.80 
30 UBL 14 0.93 1 0.5 11 0.92 7 1 3.35 0.84 
  Average 13.1667 0.88 1.27 0.63 10.77 0.90 7 1 3.40 0.85 
The above table shows that highest ODI  is 98% in the EBL. On the other hand,  lowest ODI is 77% in FSIB and 
MTBL. The  Overall  Disclosure Index in 85%. Besides, all banks disclosed more information from SA item and 
the level is 100%; while, lowest number of item were disclosed in CHC (63%). Furthermore, the second and 
third disclosure items are AC (90%) and BD (88%) respectively. 
 
6.2 Discussion of First Set of Hypotheses 
H1: There is significant influence between Board’s Size and Independent Directors. 
 
Table 9- Board’s Size * Independent Directors Cross tabulation 
Count     
  Independent Directors 
Total   No Yes 
Board’s Size No 4 0 4 
Yes 12 14 26 
Total 16 14 30 
 
The above Cross tabulation chart indicates that out of 30 banks, 26 banks disclose and follow the rules of SEC in 
case of Board’s size. On the other hand, only 14 banks follow the rules in case of Independent Directors. But, 14 
banks have followed both the rules of Board’s size and Independent Directors; whereas, 4 banks have not 
followed those rules.  
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Table 10-Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.038a 1 .044   
Continuity Correctionb 2.165 1 .141   
Likelihood Ratio 5.566 1 .018   
Fisher's Exact Test    .103 .066 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.904 1 .048 
  
N of Valid Casesb 30     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.87. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table     
The above Chi-Square Test indicates that significant level (.103) is more than (.05). So, H0 is accepted. Now, it 
can be said that there is not significant influence between Board’s Size and Independent Directors.  
H2: There is significant influence between Board’s Size and Number of board meeting held during the year and 
attendance by each director. 
Table 11-Board’s Size * Number of board meetings held during the year and attendance by each director Cross 
tabulation 
 
Count     
 
 Number of board meetings held 
during the year and attendance by 
each director 
Total   No Yes 
Board’s Size No 1 3 4 
Yes 3 23 26 
Total 4 26 30 
 
The above Cross tabulation chart indicates that out of 30 banks, 26 banks disclose and follow the rules of SEC in 
case of Board’s size and Number of board meetings held during the year and attendance by each directors. But, 
23 banks have followed both the rules of Board’s size and Number of board meetings held during the year and 
attendance by each director; whereas, 1 banks have not followed those rules. 
 
Table 12-Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .544a 1 .461   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .465 1 .495   
Fisher's Exact Test    .454 .454 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.526 1 .468 
  
N of Valid Casesb 30     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .53. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table     
The above Chi-Square Test indicates that significant level is .454 which is more than .05. So, H0 is accepted. As 
a result, it can be said that there is not significant influence between Board’s size and Number of board meetings 
held during the year and attendance by each director.  
H3: There is significant influence between Independent Directors and Inclusion of one Independent Director in 
the Audit Committee. 
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Table 13- Independent Directors * Inclusion of one Independent Directors in the Audit Committee Cross 
tabulation 
 
Count     
 
 Inclusion of one Independent 
Directors in the Audit Committee 
Total   No Yes 
Independent Directors No 10 6 16 
Yes 1 13 14 
Total 11 19 30 
 
The above Cross tabulation chart indicates that out of 30 banks, 14 banks disclose and follow the rules of SEC in 
case of Independent Directors and 19 banks do that for the Inclusion of one Independent Directors in the Audit 
Committee. But, 13 banks have followed both the rules of Independent Directors Inclusion of one Independent 
Directors in the Audit Committee; whereas, 10 banks have not followed those rules. 
Table 14- Chi-Square Tests 
 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.853a 1 .002   
Continuity Correctionb 7.613 1 .006   
Likelihood Ratio 11.055 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .002 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.525 1 .002 
  
N of Valid Casesb 30     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table     
 
The above Chi-Square Test indicates that significant level is .002 which is less than .05. So, H0 is rejected. As a 
result, it can be said that there is significant influence between Independent Directors and Inclusion of one 
Independent Directors in the Audit Committee.  
 
In the table 14, highest CV denotes that there is less consistency in disclosing information; while, lowest CV 
refers to more consistency in disclosing information. Here, EBL is in top position as its CV is lowest (4.08%) 
among the 30 enlisted banks under DSE. On the other hand, ABBL is in the bottom (30th position) as its CV is 
28.57% which is highest among those banks. 
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6.3 Sample Companies Ranking 
Table 15- Descriptive statistics 
Company 
Key 
Descriptive Statistics 
Rank ODI SD CV 
ABBL 0.875 0.25 0.285714 30 
AAIBL 0.855 0.23965 0.280292 26 
BAL 0.8375 0.2278 0.272 16 
BBL 0.8375 0.2278 0.272 16 
CBL 0.8 0.21276 0.26595 11 
DBL 0.8 0.21276 0.26595 11 
DBBL 0.9625 0.04349 0.045184 2 
EBL 0.98 0.04 0.040816 1 
EXIMBBL 0.805 0.21932 0.272447 22 
FSIBL 0.765 0.20889 0.273059 24 
IBBL 0.855 0.23965 0.280292 26 
ICBIBL 0.9125 0.12738 0.139595 8 
IFICBL 0.8375 0.2278 0.272 16 
JBL 0.8 0.21276 0.26595 11 
MBL 0.7825 0.20791 0.2657 9 
MTBL 0.765 0.20889 0.273059 24 
NBL 0.7825 0.20791 0.2657 9 
NCCBL 0.7875 0.22262 0.282692 29 
ONEBL 0.9625 0.04349 0.045184 2 
PREBL 0.8375 0.2278 0.272 16 
PRIBL 0.9625 0.04349 0.045184 2 
PUBL 0.8375 0.2278 0.272 16 
RBL 0.9075 0.10751 0.118468 7 
SHIBL 0.8225 0.22157 0.269386 15 
SIBL 0.8 0.21276 0.26595 11 
SEBL 0.8575 0.24061 0.280595 28 
SBL 0.9475 0.06397 0.067515 5 
TBL 0.9475 0.06397 0.067515 5 
UCBL 0.805 0.21932 0.272447 22 
UBL 0.8375 0.2278 0.272 16 
 
6.4 Sample Companies Attitude 
Table 16- Ranking of Disclosure Components 
 
Disclosure 
key Mean SD CV Percentage Rank 
Comments 
SA 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 Consistency is more in this 
section AC 0.8983 0.04969 0.055316 5.53156 2 
BD 0.8770 0.08408 0.095872 9.587229 3 
CHC 
0.6333 0.22489 0.355108 35.51082 4 
Consistency is less in this 
section 
 
Same as above, highest CV denotes less consistency in disclosing information and lowest CV explains more 
consistency in disclosing information. The above table shows that SA, AC and BD have more consistency 0%, 
5.53% and 9.59% respectively. On the other hand, CHC is less consistent as its CV is 35.51%. 
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6.5 Results of Descriptive Statistics 
Table 17- Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
ODI .8523 .77 .98 .0654 
BS 15.73 5.00 27.00 5.01 
PIND 4.89 .00 16.67 4.28 
PIO .3632 .0455 .9277 .2053 
PAC 28.66 15.00 60.00 11.07 
TA 121080.40 18015.00 389192.00 62780.65 
TC 11396.033 -7601.00 33717.00 7181.88 
LEV 9.69 -3.37 19.21 3.72 
 
ODI Overall Disclosure Index 
BS Board Size 
PIND Percentage of Independent Directors to Total Members on Board 
PIO Percentage of Insider Ownership to Total Share on Bank 
PAC Percentage of Audit Committee Member to Total Member on Board 
TA Total Asset in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
TC Total Capital  in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
LEV Ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity 
 
Descriptive statistics for sample companies are reported on table #. This table shows that Overall Disclosure 
Index (ODI) is 85.23% with a maximum (98%) and minimum (77%) where the standard deviation is 6.54%. The 
average number of board members is 15.73 where the maximum and minimum are 27 and 5 respectively. In case 
of Independent Directors, 4.89% directors on the board are independent directors where some companies have 
no independent directors. Besides, the percentage of inside ownership is 36.32 on average with a 4.55% 
(minimum) and 92.77% (maximum). Though the highest and lowest percentages of audit committee member to 
total members on board are 60% and 15% respectively, the average percentage is 28.67%. Average bank size in 
Bangladesh is Tk. 121068.40 millions. The highest bank size is Tk. 389192 million; while, the lowest bank size 
is Tk. 18015 millions. On the other hand, some companies have negative capital amount and leverage though 
their average mean is positive. 
 
6.6 Discussion of Correlation Analysis 
Table 18- Pearson Correlation Analysis Result (N=30) 
Variables ODI BS PIND PIO PAC TA TC LEV 
BS -.283 1.000       
PIND .391* -.336 1.000      
PIO .196 -.062 -.163 1.000     
PAC .281 -.763** .249 -.17 1.000    
TA -.037 .234 .050 -.10 -.221 1.000   
TC -.078 .306 -.019 -.25 -.285 .903** 1.000  
LEV -.202 .129 .348 .043 -.349 .136 .033 1.000 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)* 
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)** 
ODI Overall Disclosure Index 
BS Board Size 
PIND Percentage of Independent Directors to Total Members on Board 
PIO Percentage of Insider Ownership to Total Share on Bank 
PAC Percentage of Audit Committee Member to Total Member on Board 
TA Total Asset in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
TC Total Capital  in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
LEV Ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity 
6.7 Multicollinearity Test 
This study is conducted on the individual effect of the Independent variables with the ODI. So the test of 
multicollinearity has been done using the Pearson Correlation Matrix. The analysis shows that one correlation 
coefficient on total capital is greater than the threshold level of 0.80. However, Kaplan (1982) suggests that 
multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation between independent variables is 0.90 or above. 
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However, Emory (1982) considered more than 0.80 to be problematic. It is evident from the table that the 
magnitude of the correlation between variables seems to indicate no severe multicollinearity problems. The 
result shows that all the variables remained significant with the sign that was predicted. As a result, the existence 
of multicollinearity does not have any threat to the result got in the regression equation. Hence, the variable was 
kept in the regression model. 
 
6.8. Discussion of Regression Analysis 
Table 19- Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
 Coefficient Standard Error Beta t values Significance 
BS .001 .004 .207 .838 
PIND .009 .003 2.801 .010 
PIO .111 .065 1.709 .102 
PAC .001 .002 .403 .691 
TA -5.11E-008 .000 -.111 .913 
TC 8.59E-007 .000 .201 .842 
LEV -.007 .004 -1.734 .097 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)* 
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)** 
ODI Overall Disclosure Index 
BS Board Size 
PIND Percentage of Independent Directors to Total Members on Board 
PIO Percentage of Insider Ownership to Total Share on the Banks 
PAC Percentage of Audit Committee Member to Total Members on Board 
TA Total Asset in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
TC Total Capital  in Millions of Bangladeshi Taka 
LEV Ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity 
R square= .382 
Adjusted R square=.185 
F value=1.942 
F significance= 0.111 
Multiple regression analysis has been reported on table- 19 where the relation between ODI and other 
independent variables are shown. The coefficient of correlation which is known as R square, adjusted R square, 
F value and its significance, beta coefficients and t statistics for the regression model and summarized results of 
ODI with the independent variables have been shown. In this table, R square is .382 and adjusted R square 
is .185. Besides, the F value is 1.942 with a significant level of 0.111.  
Board size has a coefficient of 0.001 which is positive and the significant level is 0.838. Thus the hypothesis 1 is 
not supported and depict that board size is not positively related to the ODI. This result is contrary to Hossain et 
al. (2009) and Zahra et al. (2000). Similarly, the regression coefficient for insider ownership is 0.111 and it is 
positive. It is statistically significant at the level of 0.102. Therefore hypothesis 3 is supported and describe that 
insider ownership is negatively related ODI. Again, the coefficient of the percentage of audit committee member 
to total members on board is 0.001 which is positive and it is statistically significant at 0.691. Hence, the 
hypothesis 4 is not supported and indicates that the percentage of audit committee members to total members on 
board does not impact ODI which is same as the study of Hossain et al. (2009) but inconsistent with Ho and 
Wong (2001). 
On the other hand, percentage of independent directors to total members on board has got positive coefficient 
(0.009) with a significant level of 0.010 which supports hypothesis 2. The result illustrates that higher proportion 
of independent director on the board is positively related to ODI. This result is similar to Leftwich et al. (1981), 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Forker (1992), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Hossain et al. (2009) but contrary to the result 
of Ho and Wong (2001). Again, significant levels for these three independent variables are 0.913, 0.842 and 
0.097 respectively where total assets, total capital and leverage are not statistically significant, and show that 
there are negative relations with ODI to firm size, total capital and leverage. This means that the higher the total 
assets, total capital and leverage the lower will be ODI. The result for leverage supports the evidence of Chen 
and Jaggi (2000). Similarly, firm size refers to the total assets did not show significant relationship with ODI 
which is contrary to the evidence of Ho and Wong (2001) and Ferguson et al. (2002). 
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Table 20- Summarized Regression Results 
Variables Labels in the OLS Expected Sign Results 
       ODI  Index 
       β1 BS (+) Not Supported 
       β2 PIND (+) Supported 
       β3 PIO (-) Supported 
       β4 PAC (+) Not Supported 
       β5 TA (+) Not Supported 
       β6 TC (+) Not Supported 
       β7 LEV (+) Not Supported 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
The transperancy of disclosing corporate information is increasing day by day  and disclosure of companies in 
Bangladesh  is growing as well. Though recent some cases shows some lack of corporate governance in 
Bangladeshi companies which causes trouble arouse. As a result, many companies are positively encouraged to 
ensure a sound corporate governance within their organization that ultimately leads to make a good 
environement in the business organizations. This research gives a positive view to all stakeholders who are 
associate with the banks. This type of study is conducted earlier but this study is an extention of previous study 
which mainly deals with the Corporate Governance disclosure in banking sector. This study can be applied to 
minimize scam not only in the banking sectors but also other sectors through finding the level of disclosure of 
corporate governance. 
The findings of this study are that higher proportion of independent directors’ results higher disclosure of 
corporate governance and more insider ownership results less corporate governance. This result gives positive 
result which will promote further increase of independent directors on the board. Besides, regulatory authorities 
will emphasize to influence and stakeholders will be positive on firms that have more outside ownership. This 
study has certain limitations like it is conducted on certain banks but it did not cover total population. Besides, 
overall disclosure index is a sensitive issue. If a point is not selected clearly then it can show contradictory result. 
Furthermore, it only covers the result of one year. 
7.2 Recommendation and Policy Making 
We need a flexible, decentralized approach to corporate management and oversight, expanded rights for minority 
interest, and a system of financial auditing that is increasingly independent and transparent. The Code of 
Conduct should be made for publicly traded companied that will serve to maintain the transparency and 
independence of corporate governance. Lack of corporate governance in listed companies hinders smooth 
growth of country's capital market and erodes investors' confidence. Corporate governance in companies in a 
country depends on how the country is governed. Although Government of Bangladesh cannot force companies 
to practice corporate governance, regulators like Securities and Exchange Commission and Bangladesh Bank can 
play role in this regard. In Bangladesh, many multinationals and local companies are practicing corporate 
governance in Bangladesh and this should be projected properly. 
The existing Companies Act is outdated and is neither progressive nor user-friendly. It is necessary to make 
things more relevant to match with today's needs. A positive approach towards ensuring transparency in 
accounting, auditing and reporting systems and amending the Companies Act are crucial factors to improve 
corporate governance. Bangladesh's corporate practices went backwards instead of moving forward to meet the 
needs of time as the disclosure requirements under the Companies Act 1994 were based on the British 
Companies Act 1948, where corporate culture was very conservative at that time. The existing rules and 
regulations are not enough to bring transparency in the accounting and auditing systems. In many cases these are 
outdated and not relevant to today's needs. There are many important items in the Bangladesh or International 
Accounting Standards which should be disclosed but there is no legal requirement to do so. The adopted 
International Accounting Standards must be made mandatory for the listed companies in Bangladesh.  
Most of our neighboring countries have already introduced a Code of Corporate Governance for listed 
companies, banks and corporate entities, but we are still lagging behind in this respect. It is the high time for 
Bangladesh to formulate a national corporate governance code to bring in transparency and reduce corruption in 
corporate sector and the comprehensive code should cover private sector as well as state-owned enterprises and 
non-governmental organizations. There is a national consensus in Bangladesh that better governance is the key 
to improving the performance of public sector institutions. However, Bangladesh’s public sector functions with 
limited transparency and weak accountability. As a result, this creates an environment in which corruption can 
flourish, and many public services are inefficient and insufficiently responsive to client needs. Governance 
improvements therefore need to be at the heart of Bangladesh’s development strategy. The first is the initial step 
to separate the audit and accounting functions. Having the same people responsible for accounting and auditing 
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is obviously a conflict of interest. 
Improved corporate governance is critical to increasing investment and making it more productive. Domestically, 
it is essential to increase investor confidence as the private sector moves from family firms to more broadly 
owned companies that mobilize funds from the public. Better accounting and financial reporting and stronger 
auditing are also necessary to convince prospective foreign investors that there is a sound business environment 
in your country. To improve corporate governance, we need amendment of legislation to make Bangladesh 
accounting and auditing standards mandatory for all public limited companies and the establishment of Audit 
Committees in all listed companies having adequate shareholder participation; computerization of the operations 
and strengthening the office of the Registrar of Companies; the establishment of a National Accounting and 
Auditing Standards Board with representation from the users of accounts and regulators; the creation of a sub-
professional accounting qualification; and the preparation of strategic plans to expand the output of professional 
accountants and auditors. 
It is well-known that most of the listed companies in Bangladesh are owned by family members or closely held. 
In most cases, these family members become the chief executive officer (CEO) or managing director and 
chairman of the board. They sit in the board as well as they dispose off the executive functions as CEOs or 
executive directors. As a result, the independence of the board is lacking. As family members are afraid of losing 
control, they hardly allow directors from non-sponsor shareholders in the board. As these companies are closely 
held, the board meetings are restricted to paper work only and the policy decisions and executive functions are in 
the hands of sponsor-directors. It can be said that the sponsors have very little exposure to the today's modern 
management system and they are not inclined to depend on professionally qualified management.  
In the companies of Bangladesh, the internal audit function is almost missing. Financial audit is a matter of 
getting the accounts signed by the auditors and the operating results published in the annual reports are the ones 
dictated by the sponsors. And disclosure requirements, such sponsors have the belief that it will make their 
companies vulnerable to their competitors and, to them; interest of the minority shareholders is limited to 
dividend, not management. The sponsor are mostly of the view that independent or external directors will not act 
prudently for no interest in the company, separation of management from ownership will make no room for the 
owner to participate in the decision-making process of the company and audit committee with non-sponsor 
director as its Chairman may create financial indiscipline when the sponsor director is the CEO. 
Considering the scenario, it can easily be inferred that the corporate governance among the listed companies is at 
its lowest ebb. Weak corporate governance is considered to be single factor for poor performance of the 
Bangladesh capital market. In contrast to this, other regional countries like India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have 
seen gradual improvements in performance of the listed companies and the capital market. In an emerging 
market if the corporate governance remains poor, compared to other weak macro fundamentals, the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) or portfolio investment is also bound to fall over the years and, perhaps, this is what has 
happened in case of Bangladesh. The adoption of corporate governance principles by Bangladesh will be a major 
step towards creating safeguards against corruption and mismanagement, promoting transparency in corporate 
life and attracting foreign investment. 
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